All the senators found Caesar's proposals to be fair, as he showed them<hr>
that if they desired for him to lay down his arms and Pompey not to do so, it could potentially lead him<hr>
to ascend to monarchy. Yet, by suggesting that both of them lay down their arms, he was asking for something<hr>
beneficial to all, and it should not upset Pompey if he did not harbor<hr>
any sinister motivations. Scipio, his father-in-law, and Marcellus, his friend, were obviously<hr>
disagreeing, and they were almost the only ones preventing Caesar from gaining what he sought.<hr>
They spoke loudly and clearly in favour of Pompey, so that the Senate, unable to reach any<hr>
decision, a public impartiality was decreed for this private dispute. Nevertheless, Caesar<hr>
did not give up, proposing fair resolutions repeatedly, but each time,<hr>
Pompey's cunning prevailed.<hr>
       Moreover, I don't see how one could accuse Caesar of wanting to seize<hr>
supreme power, as not long before, when Pompey had asked him to<hr>
return the troops he had entrusted to him, Caesar had sent them back without hesitation,<hr>
thus showing that he did not fear weakening his own strength or augmenting those of his<hr>
enemies, thus, he had no hidden intent. And where are the extensive<hr>
war preparations that Caesar would have undertaken for such a major project? Where are the alliances he<hr>
would have forged in Rome or other cities? Where were these large armies, this significant number<hr>
of war machines for the battles he was to fight or the sieges he was to<hr>
carry out? No, Lepidus, Caesar had none of these things. When Curio and Mark<hr>
Antony joined him, disguised as slaves, and they informed him of the abuses they had<hr>
suffered at the hands of Pompey and the alarming projects that the latter was planning against<hr>
Caesar and the Republic, he only had around him five thousand infantrymen<hr>
and three hundred horsemen. Lepidus, do you really think these troops were sufficient for a<hr>
conquest of such magnitude? If Caesar had intended this, he would without a doubt have<hr>
raised a stronger army and would have found reasons to do so. He was too wise<hr>
to undertake such a thing without having greatly sought the means of succeeding. Thus,<hr>
his crossing of that famous stream, made famous by its crossing, was not the result<hr>
of a premeditated act.  It was rather a result of his anger, his shame and his<hr>
indignation, coupled with a burning desire to take vengeance on his enemy and to annihilate a man who<hr>
not only wished to destroy him, but also aimed to destroy the Republic. Therefore he left without<hr>
any planning, and with the gods as his guides, he became master of Italy in<hr>
sixty days without shedding the blood of his fellow citizens. As for Pompey, his conduct<hr>
clearly showed that the torment of his conscience made him lose his reason. It was no longer<hr>
that great Pompey who, when he harbored only legitimate intentions and serving the<hr>
Republic, demonstrated as much prudence as courage.<hr>
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                                                   108<hr>